The Pearl Harbor
Michael T. Griffith
@All Rights Reserved
On December 7, 1941, shortly after sunrise, the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor. Until that
moment, polls showed there was strong opposition to entering the war unless we
were directly attacked. There is evidence that President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (FDR) and certain other government officials knew the Japanese were
going to attack Pearl Harbor, that FDR actually provoked the attack and then
allowed it to happen to get the American people to support America’s entry into
the war, and that he unfairly blamed the local commanders in Hawaii to cover
his tracks and to appease an outraged public. This article presents some
of that evidence.
Provoking An Attack
* In early 1941, FDR began to wage economic warfare on Japan.
He imposed harsh sanctions that severely damaged Japan’s economy. His excuse
for the sanctions was that he was reacting to and/or trying to curb Japanese
aggression in China and Indochina. However, he imposed no such severe
sanctions on the Soviets when they launched a brutal invasion of China’s
Sinkiang province in 1934. Nor did he take any such drastic action when
the Soviet regime murdered millions of its own citizens in bloody purges from
1934 to 1938. Nor did he seek to seriously harm the Soviet economy when
the Soviets occupied Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania
Roosevelt knew that his sanctions were doing enormous damage
to the Japanese economy and that Japan could not allow them to
continue for very long. In addition, he had been warned that his
sanctions would provoke the Japanese to fight. Yet, when the Japanese
finally responded to his provocations with military action, he pretended to be
totally “surprised.” And, needless to say, FDR was being less than honest
when he told the American people that the attack was “unprovoked.”
* Roosevelt refused to
accept reasonable Japanese peace proposals, but he was willing to bend over
backwards to appease the Soviets. Japan
was anti-communist and capitalist, and did not want war with America. Until FDR came
along, Japan and America
had enjoyed fairly good relations for most of the previous three decades.
In the face of FDR’s hostile diplomacy and crippling sanctions, the Japanese
offered major concessions and even let it be known that they would essentially
ignore their treaty with Germany
in the event America
intervened in Europe. But Roosevelt refused every Japanese offer and replied with
unreasonable terms that he knew the Japanese would not accept.
* Internal memos and other documents show that FDR was
determined to maneuver the Japanese into “firing the first shot.” For example,
Secretary of War Henry Stimson recorded the following in his diary regarding a
November 25 meeting with FDR and a handful of other national security
He [FDR] brought up the event that
we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1],
for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the
question was what we should do. The
question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first
shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult
proposition. . . .
In spite of the risk involved,
however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order
to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure
that the Japanese were the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt
in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors.
It is worth noting that neither FDR nor Stimson, nor anyone
else at that meeting, bothered to inform the local commanders in Hawaii—Admiral
Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short—that the Japanese were “likely” to
attack as early as December 1.
* FDR’s bizarre decision to move the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii in June 1940
seems to indicate his intent to use the fleet as bait for an attack.
Moving the fleet to Hawaii
made no sense—tactically, strategically, logistically, or financially.
Admiral James O. Richardson, the fleet’s commander, strongly opposed the
move. Roosevelt’s excuse was that basing
the fleet in Hawaii would discourage Japanese
aggression in the Far East. This was an utterly
bogus justification, and FDR’s own subsequent actions proved it was a phony
excuse. When FDR floated this excuse to Admiral Richardson in a
face-to-face meeting in October, the admiral couldn’t believe what he was
hearing. As Richardson
pointed out the glaring flaws in Roosevelt’s
argument, the discussion became rather heated.
FDR unjustly fired Richardson
a few months later. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, many Navy officers,
including Admiral William Halsey and Admiral Robert Theobald,
came to believe that FDR moved the fleet to Hawaii to serve as bait for a Japanese
Foreknowledge that Pearl Harbor
Would Be Attacked
* In January 1941, nearly a year before the attack, Dr.
Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian minister in Tokyo, advised Max Bishop, Third Secretary of the U.S.
Embassy, that he had learned from multiple sources that the Japanese were
discussing a plan to attack Pearl Harbor if relations with America were ruptured. Bishop relayed this information to his boss,
Ambassador Joseph Grew. Grew regarded Shreiber as a reliable source. On January 27, Grew sent the following
message to the State Department:
The Peruvian minister has informed
a member of my staff that he heard from many sources, including a Japanese
source, that, in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan,
the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl
Harbor. . . .
Admiral Harold Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations,
informed Admiral Kimmel of this report, but he presented it to him as nothing
but a wild, baseless rumor that he was passing on merely for information
purposes. The message that Stark sent
Kimmel about Ambassador Grew’s report included the
statement that according to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) “no move
against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or
planned for in the foreseeable future.”
Stark's dismissal of Grew's report in his message
to Kimmel is troubling because Stark himself, barely two weeks earlier, had
endorsed a memo from the chief of the Navy’s War Plans Division to the
Secretary of War that stated that if America and Japan went to war “it is
believed entirely possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise
attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor." Stark
never corrected his dismissal of Ambassador Grew’s
report, even when he became aware of a Japanese intercept, known as the “bomb
plot message,” that indicated preparation for a bombing attack on Pearl Harbor.
The same day that Ambassador Grew advised the State
Department of the Peruvian warning, he wrote the following in his journal:
There is a lot of talk around town
to the effect that the Japanese, in case of a break with the United States, are planning to go all out in a
surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. Of
course I informed our Government.
* On October 9, Roosevelt
received a copy of a decrypted Japanese intercept commonly known as the “bomb
plot message.” This message and subsequent follow-up messages made it
clear that the Japanese were planning an attack on Pearl
Harbor. Yet, Roosevelt said
nothing about this information to Kimmel and Short. The minority report of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (JCC) said the
following about the bomb plot message:
The probability that the Pacific
Fleet would be attacked at Pearl Harbor was clear from the "bomb
plot" available in Washington
as early as October 9, 1941, and related Japanese messages. . . .
In the "bomb plot"
message of September 24, 1941, the Japanese Government gave detailed
instructions to its consul general in Hawaii
as to the character of report it required concerning vessels in Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor
was to be divided into five subareas. An alphabetical symbol was given each
area. . . .
On November 15, 18, 20, and 29 the
Japanese Government urgently called for information about the location of ships
in Pearl Harbor (exhibit 2, p. 13-15). On
November 15 the Japanese consul in Honolulu
was directed to make his "ships in harbor report" irregular but at
the rate of twice a week (exhibit 2, p. 13). The reports were to give vessel
locations in specific areas of the harbor, using the symbols established in
September (exhibit 2, p. 15). The greatest secrecy was enjoined because
relations between Japan and
the United States
were described as "most critical." On November 18 the Japanese consul
general reported to Tokyo the locations of the
ships in the various subareas of Pearl Harbor,
giving minute descriptions of the courses, speed, and distances apart of
destroyers entering the harbor (exhibit 2, p. 14). On November 29 reports were
requested even though there were no movements of ships. These dispatches were
intercepted, decoded, and translated in Washington
on December 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1941.
The "bomb plot" message,
and those messages relating to Pearl Harbor which followed it, meant that the
ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor
were marked for a Japanese attack. No other American harbor was divided into
subareas by Japan.
And no other American harbor had such a large share of the fleet to protect.
In no other area did Japan
seek information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same
wharf. Prior to the "bomb plot" message Japanese espionage in Hawaii was directed to
ascertain the general whereabouts of the American Fleet, whether at sea or in
port. With the "bomb plot" message Japan inaugurated a new policy
directed to Pearl Harbor and to no other place, in which information was no
longer sought merely as to the general whereabouts of the fleet, but as to the
presence of particular ships in particular areas of the harbor. In the period
immediately preceding the attack Japan
required such reports even when there was no movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. The reports which Japan thus sought and received had
a useful purpose only in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in
port. . . .
October 9th, 1941 (ex. 2, p. 12), Lieutenant Commander Kramer of Naval
Intelligence in Washington promptly distributed the Pearl Harbor "bomb
plot" message to the President, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval Communications, the
Director of War Plans, and the Director of Naval Intelligence (Tr., Vol. 59 p.
11209). It bore the notation "interesting message" on a gist or flag
(Tr., Vol. 59, p. 11207). It was accompanied by a summary of its contents as
directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five
areas for the purpose of showing exact locations” (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 11207).
The new chief of ONI, Captain Alan Kirk, recognized the
implications of the bomb plot message and urged that Admiral Kimmel be warned
about it. So did Captain Harold Bode, head of the Foreign Intelligence
Branch at ONI. So did Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum, head of ONI’s Far East Section. So did Commander Laurance
Safford, head of the Communications Security Division, Office of Naval Communications.
But three admirals blocked all attempts to tell Kimmel
anything about the bomb plot message.
Revealingly, the leader in this inexcusable withholding of vital
information was Admiral Stark. Admiral Richmond Turner (Director of War
Plans) and Admiral Leigh Noyes (Director of Naval Communications) also opposed
informing Kimmel about the message, but Stark was the key player. When
Captains Kirk and Bode teamed up to push for a warning to be sent to Kimmel,
Admiral Turner appealed to Admiral Stark, and Stark ruled against the warning,
even though the bomb plot message clearly lent credence to the Peruvian warning
relayed by Ambassador Grew about a Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor.
As a result, Admiral Kimmel never received a copy of the bomb plot intercept
and was never even told it existed.
* In November, the Roosevelt
administration declared the North Pacific a “vacant sea” and ordered all
American and Allied shipping out of this area. This was the same area
through which the Japanese task force would travel to attack Pearl
Harbor. Two weeks before the attack, Admiral Kimmel deployed
a portion of his fleet to the north of Hawaii
for surveillance purposes, but he received an order from Washington to pull his ships back. To
this day, no credible innocent explanation for the “vacant sea” order has been
* Leslie Grogan, an experienced radioman on the SS Lurline, a Matson Line passenger ship, heard
transmissions from the Japanese task force heading toward Pearl Harbor and determined
that the task force was in the North Pacific and heading toward Hawaii. Grogan
noticed that the messages were being repeated. Grogan knew that rebroadcasts
were used by ships that were communicating at long distances. There were
no ships in the North Pacific that would have needed to use repeat-backs except
those of the Japanese fleet steaming toward Hawaii. As Grogan heard these
broadcasts, he used direction-finder (DF) bearings to discover their
location. He determined that the
Japanese ships that were generating the radio signals were located in the North
Pacific and were heading east, toward Hawaii.
Grogan kept a careful record of the DF bearings and the times of transmission
in his logbook. Grogan noticed that the Japanese ships seemed to stop or
“bunch up” on December 2. This is another indication that Grogan was
monitoring the Japanese task force, because we know that Admiral Nagumo, the task force commander, had been ordered to reach
the “standby position” by December 2.
When the SS Lurline arrived
in Honolulu on
December 3, Grogan and Chief Operator Rudy Asplund
delivered a detailed report to Lieutenant Commander George Pease of the 14th
Naval District’s intelligence office. Pease promised to pass along
the information. When the ship docked in San Francisco on December 10, a Navy officer
confiscated the ship’s logbook. Naval
archive records confirm the existence of the logbook, so we know that the Navy
took possession of it. However, like so many other important documents relating
to foreknowledge of the attack, the logbook has gone “missing” from the Navy’s
Some defenders of the traditional story claim that Grogan
misidentified innocent signals from Japanese commercial vessels in Japan’s
home waters, but this assertion is implausible. Historians Brian Villa
and Timothy Wilford (who also happens to be an
It is virtually unarguable that the
automatic repeat of messages that caught Grogan's attention in the first days
of December were the signals of a major naval force
conducting operations at a very great distance from its base of operations. No
attempt to dismiss these signals as those of some stray Japanese fishing fleet
will hold any water. Nor can any credence be attached to the suggestion that
the signals might have come from some major American, British or Dutch naval
force in the quadrant that Grogan identified as the originating source of these
automatic repeats. We know that such naval forces of the ABD powers that
operated in the Pacific were all in the southwestern quadrant, not the
northwestern. In the high Pacific there was no force that would be using
automatic repeating save Japan's.
. . .
In the context of the whole
evidence it is virtually unarguable that Grogan heard the signals of the Kido
Butai, and that from his report detailing the
movement of the "beacon" signals, the direction of the Japanese
movement could have easily been ascertained. Most tellingly, Grogan carefully
noted that the flotilla stopped moving on 2 December, the date when Admiral Nagumo awaited confirmation of the attack plans while
refueling in the North Pacific. We also know beyond any doubt that responsible
officers of the Matson Line communicated this information to USN intelligence
in Hawaii three days prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. That is not just the contention of
Leslie Grogan but also of a steamship company that was heavily dependent on
government contracts and subsidies.
If Grogan was able to intercept radio signals from the
Japanese fleet and to determine the fleet’s location, it is virtually certain
that the American intelligence listening stations in and near the Pacific were
able to do so as well. There is evidence that Navy intelligence was in
fact tracking the Japanese task force and knew it was nearing Pearl Harbor.
* On December 6, the Alaska Defense Command sent a message
to the 37th Infantry Division stating that Japanese ships were “270
miles southeast of Dutch Harbor,” which meant the ships were in the North
Pacific, just about due north of Hawaii, nowhere near where the official
version says the U.S. Navy believed the ships of the task force were
located. The message said this information came from the Navy.
* On December 6, FDR and other senior officials read decrypts
of the first 13 parts of the 14-part Japanese diplomatic cable that Roosevelt had been waiting to receive. It was
clearly a declaration of war, even though it was not labeled as such. In
fact, when Roosevelt finished reading it, he
turned to his top aide, Harry Hopkins, and said, “This means war.” Yet, FDR did not warn Kimmel and Short.
By the evening of December 6, it was readily apparent that
hostilities with Japan were
imminent, but no one warned the commanders in Hawaii. Congressman Frank Keefe wrote
the following in the JCC Pearl Harbor
evening of December 6, in response to Secretary Stimson's request and at the
direction of Secretary Knox, the Navy Department compiled from its records a
summary showing that all the major ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor. At this time the information available in Washington showed that
war was only hours away. Yet the two Secretaries and the high command made no
effort to direct any change in the dispositions of the Fleet as shown in the
Navy Department summary. They took no steps to furnish Admiral Kimmel the
information which they possessed as to the imminence of war.
* On December 7, Roosevelt, General George Marshall (Army
Chief of Staff), Admiral Stark, and a few other senior officials read the 14th
part of the 14-part Japanese diplomatic cable, along with the time-of-delivery
message that directed the Japanese ambassadors to deliver the 14-part message
to the U.S. State Department at precisely 1:00 p.m., Eastern time, which
corresponded to shortly after sunrise in Hawaii. The implication of the
timing was immediately recognized by some senior military officers. The
message stated that negotiations were over and that there was no hope for peace
in the Pacific. This was clearly a signal that hostilities were imminent.
Yet, FDR did not call the commanders in Hawaii.
Nor did Admiral Stark, even though he was urged to do so by Admiral Theodore
Wilkinson, the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (Wilkinson was
alarmed by the contents of the 14-part message). Nor
did General Marshall, even though he had a scrambler phone on his desk, and
even though Admiral Stark offered him the use of the Navy radio system to warn
the commanders in the Pacific. (Stark may have been engaging in
self-serving posturing in making this offer, since by law he had the authority
as the Chief of Naval Operations to use the Navy radio system to warn Kimmel
and the other Pacific commanders.)
About an hour before the attack, Marshall, through Colonel Rufus Bratton, sent
a weakly worded warning message to Kimmel and Short. The warning was sent via
commercial telegraph and, incredibly, was not even sent as a priority
message. As a result, the warning didn’t reach Kimmel and Short until
hours after the attack.
Marshall later claimed that
he did not use the scrambler phone because he feared the Japanese would
overhear the message and would know that their codes had been broken. Of course, Marshall could have warned Kimmel and Short
without saying anything about Japanese intercepts. For that matter, he
could have given them a cover story to account for the warning (e.g., he could
have told them that an American maritime vessel had spotted Japanese naval
ships northwest of Hawaii or that an American spy in Tokyo had reported that a
Japanese fleet was nearing Hawaii). John Chamberlain commented on Marshall’s claim in a
September 24, 1945, article in Life magazine:
By use of the “scrambler phone” Marshall could have reached Short well before the sun was
up in Hawaii
on the morning of the 7th. . . . Marshall’s explanation for not using the
phone was that he didn’t want to risk interception by the Japanese. But
the Japanese certainly knew their own plans.
. . . If the Japanese had intercepted a Marshall phone call, they had only one
alternative to carrying through with their attack, and that was the alternative
of calling it off.
It is hard to believe that these obvious, common-sense considerations
did not occur to Marshall.
* FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover received advance warning of
the Pearl Harbor attack, and probably from
multiple sources. Hoover relayed this
information to FDR. It is interesting to note that on
December 3, FBI Special Agent in Charge Robert Shivers of the Hawaii FBI office
told the head of the Honolulu Espionage Bureau, Lieutenant John Burns, that Hawaii would be attacked
by the end of the week. Burns revealed this warning in interviews
conducted at the University
of Hawaii in 1975. Two of Burns’ subordinates later
confirmed Burns’ account.
* Congressman Martin Dies revealed in 1963 that his House
Un-American Activities Committee, while investigating Japanese espionage
activities in 1941, uncovered a Japanese military map that provided “precise
information of the proposed attack” on Pearl Harbor.
Dies said that when he told Secretary of State Cordell Hull about this
information, Hull asked him to keep quiet about
it because of the “extremely delicate” diplomatic situation between America and Japan. Dies also reported
that representatives from the State Department, the Army, and the Navy examined
the map. Said Dies,
Early in 1941 the Dies Committee
came into possession of a strategic map which gave clear proof of the
intentions of the Japanese to make an assault on Pearl
Harbor. The strategic map was prepared by the Japanese Imperial
Military Intelligence Department. As soon as I received the document I telephoned
Secretary of State Cordell Hull and told him what I had. Secretary Hull
directed me not to let anyone know about the map and stated that he would call
me as soon as he talked to President Roosevelt. In about an hour he telephoned
to say that he had talked to Roosevelt and
they agreed that it would be very serious if any information concerning this
map reached the news services. . . . I told him it was a grave responsibility
to withhold such vital information from the public. The Secretary assured me
that he and Roosevelt considered it essential to national defense.
Scapegoating Kimmel and
* After the attack, FDR moved quickly to place all the blame
on Admiral Kimmel and General Short. He ordered that they be relieved of
command and forced to retire. This was a shameful travesty of
justice. Roosevelt knew he had withheld
vital intelligence from these fine officers, yet he had no qualms about ruining
their reputations and their careers to cover his tracks and to satisfy an angry
* As if this wasn’t bad enough, FDR created a special
investigative commission, known as the Roberts Commission, whose sole function
was to blame Kimmel and Short. Not only did the Roberts Commission assign
all blame to Kimmel and Short, but it gave high marks to the senior military
officers in Washington who had played key—and very suspicious—roles in
withholding intelligence from Kimmel and Short, i.e., General Marshall and
Admiral Stark. The commission even made the incredible claim that Kimmel
and Short were given ample information about the imminence of hostilities but
failed to act on it. When Admiral Richardson, the previous commander of
the Pacific Fleet, read the commission’s report, he condemned it in the
It is the most unfair, unjust, and
deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government Printing Office.
In order to overcome the American public’s opposition to
entering the war, FDR needlessly provoked war with Japan
and then pretended to be "surprised" when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.
a model of democracy and pluralism? No, but it was not as oppressive as
the Soviet Union. Could the Japanese
army be vicious? Yes, as it disgracefully proved in Nanking,
but it was no more vicious than the Soviet army. Was Japan’s Hideki Tojo
a ruthless leader? Yes, but he was not nearly as ruthless as Soviet
dictator Joseph Stalin. FDR was ever ready to cut deals with Stalin and
to appease the Soviets, but he refused to establish good relations with Japan.
This is not surprising, given that FDR was enthralled with Soviet communism and
that his administration included Soviet sympathizers and even some Soviet
spies. While Roosevelt exaggerated and railed against Japanese aggression
in China and Indochina, he turned a blind eye to Soviet aggression and
to Stalin's murder of some 20 million Soviet citizens.
Soviet policy called for war between Japan and the
West. The Soviets feared that if Japan
and America reached a peace
agreement, the Japanese might attack the Soviet Union
at some point in the near future. The
Soviets did not want to see a peace deal between the Japanese and the Chinese
Nationalists either, because that would free up the Nationalists to destroy the
Chinese Communists, whom the Soviets were aiding, and would put the Japanese in
a better position if war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union. It
is no exaggeration to say that FDR seemed to do all he could to implement
Soviet policy in the Pacific. Not only did he reject Japan’s peace offers, but he rejected Japan’s request that America
broker a peace deal between Japan
and the Chinese Nationalists.
If you would like to read more about the Pearl
Harbor attack and to get some idea of how unethical and misguided
FDR's handling of WW II was, I would recommend the following four references:
Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy (Auburn, AL:
LVMI, 2010), by Percy Greaves. Greaves served as counsel for the
Republican minority on the congressional committee that investigated the Pearl Harbor attack shortly after the war.
Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Washington,
Press, 2007), by Dr. George Victor.
Betrayed: Herbert Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and Its
Aftermath (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 2011), by Dr. George Nash.
Department of State Publication, 1983, Peace
and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 617-618; Robert Theobald,
The Final Secret of Pearl
Harbor (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1954), p. 43.
2. Memo from Stark to Kimmel, dated
February 1, 1941, serial number 09716.
3. John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (New York: Doubleday
Books, 1983), p. 252.
4. Joseph Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1944), p. 368.
5. Minority report, Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (JCC), Report of
the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 516-519, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/minority.html#520http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/minority.html#520 (the
Joint Committee’s report will hereafter be cited as JCC Pearl Harbor Report).
6. Toland, Infamy,
7. Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (New York: Touchstone Books, 2001), pp.
144-148. Click here to read Stinnett’s
documentation on this point online. See also Timothy Wilford,
Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio
Intelligence in 1941 (New York:
University Press of America, 2001), pp. 108-109.
8. Toland, Infamy, pp. 278-281, 285; George
Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking
the Unthinkable (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books,
2007), pp. 48-49.
9. Brian Villa and Timothy Wilford,
“Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and
the Tracking of the Kido Butai,” The
Northern Mariner, volume 11, number 2 (April 2001), pp. 12-13 (http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol11/nm_11_2_1to17.pdf).
Kido Butai was the tactical designation for
the Japanese task force and quickly came to be used as a nickname for it.
Phillip Jacobsen sought to debunk the SS Lurline
evidence in his 2005 article “Pearl Harbor:
Radio Officer Leslie Grogan of the SS Lurline and His
Misidentified Signals,” Cryptologia,
29:2, 2005, pp. 97-120. Jacobsen’s article
is loaded with misleading misrepresentations and faulty logic. Villa and Wilford
have responded at length to Jacobsen’s claims in their article “Signals
Intelligence and Pearl
Harbor,” Intelligence and National
Security, 21:4, 2006, pp. 520-556. As
just one example of Jacobsen’s misleading arguments, Jacobsen pretends that
Grogan contradicted himself because he described the signals as faint but later
said they were loud and clear. However,
as Jacobsen surely knew, the comment about the signals being “faint” referred
to the first time Grogan heard them, when they were indeed faint, while the
latter comment referred to when Grogan heard the signals after the task force
and the SS Lurline
had moved close to each other.
10. Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth, pp. 45-47;
Toland, Infamy, pp. 282, 298, 325; Wilford, “Decoding Pearl Harbor: USN Cryptanalysis and the
Challenge of JN-25B in 1941,” The
Northern Mariner, volume 12, number 1 (January 2002), pp. 17-37 (http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/cryptanalysis.pdf).
11. Toland, Infamy, p. 325. 270 miles southeast of Dutch
Harbor is about 1,800 miles from Pearl Harbor. It
is possible that the location was based on DF bearings or sightings that were
two, three, or four days old. If nothing
else, this was certainly information that should have been relayed to Admiral
Kimmel and General Short.
12. Some defenders of the
official story claim there’s no evidence Roosevelt said this, but Lieutenant
Commander Lester Schulz, who delivered the 13 parts to FDR, told the JCC that
he was present in the Oval Study when Roosevelt read the 13 parts and that he
heard him say “this means war” (JCC Pearl
Harbor Report, p. 216).
Views of Mr. Keefe,” JCC Pearl Harbor Report, p.
14. Stark could have used
the Navy radio himself to warn Admiral Kimmel, and in fact, as mentioned, Stark
was urged to do so by Admiral Noyes. Some scholars theorize that FDR had
directed that Marshall
had to approve any kind of warning message sent to Kimmel or Short. This
is a plausible suggestion. Stark’s actions on the morning of December 7
suggest that Marshall
had final authority over messages sent to the Hawaiian commanders.
15. Marshall told the JCC the incredible tale
that he feared that if he used the scrambler phone and the Japanese overheard
his warning, the Japanese would construe this as a
hostile act (JCC Pearl Harbor Report,
p. 226; “Additional Views of Mr. Keefe,” JCC
Pearl Harbor Report, p. 266-N)! At one point Marshall also said that
he did not even consider using the phone or that he may have considered it but
decided against it (JCC Pearl Harbor
Report, pp. 225-226).
Chamberlain, “Pearl Harbor,” Life (September 24, 1945), p. 113,
17. Toland, Infamy, pp. 326-327.
18. Toland, Infamy, pp. 285-286.
19. Toland, Infamy, p. 329.
20. Martin Dies, Martin
Dies Story (New York: Bookmailer, 1963), p. 165.
21. James O. Richardson, On
the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor (Department
of the Navy: Navy History Division, 1973), p. 453.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Michael T.
Griffith holds a Master’s degree in Theology from The Catholic Distance
University, a Graduate Certificate in Ancient and Classical History from
American Military University, a Bachelor’s degree in Liberal Arts from
Excelsior College, two Associate in Applied Science degrees from the Community
College of the Air Force, and an Advanced Certificate of Civil War Studies and
a Certificate of Civil War Studies from Carroll College. He is a two-time
graduate of the Defense Language Institute in Monterey,
California, in Arabic and Hebrew, and of the
U.S. Air Force Technical Training School in San Angelo,
Texas, and has completed advanced Hebrew
programs at Haifa University in Israel
and at the Spiro Institute in London,
He is also the author of five books on Mormonism and ancient texts and one book
on the John F. Kennedy assassination.
Mike Griffith’s Pearl Harbor